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Résumé
Cette étude s’intéresse à la relation entre la qualité 
d’audit  et  les  caractéristiques  des  investisseurs
institutionnels  dans  le  contexte français.  Après  le 
scandale  d’Enron,  la  perception  des  investisseurs 
institutionnels  envers  les  Big  4  a  changé.  Notre 
première hypothèse s’intéresse à la relation entre la 
propriété  institutionnelle  et  le  choix  des  Big  4. 
Alors que notre deuxième hypothèse s’intéresse à la 
perception  des  investisseurs  institutionnels 
étrangers et la désignation au moins d’un auditeur 
des Big 4 après le scandale d’Enron et le manque de
protection  des  investisseurs  institutionnels  en 
France par rapport aux pays du common Law. Pour 
tester  nos  hypothèses,  nous  faisons  recourt  aux 
données de 144 entreprises cotées sur le SBF 250 
obtenues  auprès  de  la  base  donnée  Worldscope 
entre  2000  et  2007.  Les  résultats  empiriques 
montrent  qu’il  y  a  une  relation  négativement 
significative  entre  les  investisseurs  institutionnels 
français et le choix d’au moins un Big 4 après le 
scandale  d’Enron.  Par  contre,  cette  relation  est 
positivement  significative  entre  les  investisseurs 
institutionnels  étrangers  et  la  désignation  d’au 
moins d’un Big 4 après 2002.
Mots  clés  :  Qualité  d’audit,  choix  de  l’auditeur, 
investisseurs institutionnels, scandale d’Enron.
Abstract
This  study  examines  the  association  between  the 
quality  of  audit  and  the  characteristics  of 
institutional investors, using French data. After the 
Enron  scandal,  the  perception  of  the  Big  4 by 
French  institutional  investors  changed.  Our  first 
hypothesis  focuses  on  the  perception  French 
institutional investors to appointment of the Big 4. 
Our second hypothesis deals with the perception of 
the foreign institutional investors to choose one of 
the  Big  4  auditors  due to  the  lack  of  investor 
protection in France and the failure of Enron. We 
tested  our  hypotheses  on  a  sample  of  144 
companies  listed  on  SBF  250,  using  Worldscope 
data over the period 2000-2007. Empirical results 
show  a  negative  and  statistically  significant  link 
between  the  choices  of  one  of  Big  4  auditor  by 
French  institutional  investors  after  the  Enron 
scandal, whereas there is a positive and statistically 
insignificant link between  the foreign institutional 
investor and the Big 4 appointment after 2002.
Key  Words: Audit  quality,  auditor  choice, 





































Author manuscript, published in "Crises et nouvelles probl￩matiques de la Valeur, Nice : France (2010)"1. Introduction
Previous research shows that there has been much debate over audit quality. DeAngelo (1981) 
defines audit quality as the probability that the auditor will both detect and report a breach in 
the contract to provide fair accounting information. However, recent empirical researchers 
suggest that big audit firms guarantee audit quality. Becker et al. (1998) found that the firms 
audited by Big 4 had lower discretionary accruals in the United States than the firms audited 
by Non-Big 4. Palmrose (1988) analysed the relation between the audit litigation and the audit
service quality. He reported that audits by the Big 4 (ex-Big 8) were less likely to result in 
litigation. In summary, audit quality is associated to the Big 4 brand name. 
The failure of Enron was announced at the end of 2001. Andersen Houston Office played a 
significant role in this scandal. Three reactions were noted after this failure. The first one 
concerns the reaction of the financial market. Cahan and Zhang (2006) studied the reaction of 
the share price of Andersen’s clients in 521 firms in 38 different countries outside the United 
States.  They  noted  that  share  prices  reacted  negatively  between  December  12,  2001  and 
February 4, 2002. The second reaction is associated to the Big 4 brand name. The Big 4 lost 
their reputation after this scandal. Otherwise, the perception of the service offered by the Big 
4 by investors changed after the Enron scandal. The third reaction concerns the legislative 
sector. In 2002, the United States adopted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. This law establishes new 
procedures  of  corporate  governance  and  search  to  guarantee  the  auditor  independence  in 
United States context. In France, a similar law related to financial security was passed in 
2003.
The goal of this paper is to study the relationship between the characteristics of institutional 
investors and audit quality in France after the Enron scandal. Empirical results make a major 
contribution to auditing literature. We find a negative relation between French institutional 
investors and Big 4 appointment after the Enron collapse. This means that, if the French 
institutional investor has a majority ownership, the probability of hiring the Big 4 decreases 
after the Enron scandal. We also find an insignificant positive relation between the choice of 
the  Big  4  and  foreign  institutional  investors  in  France  after  Enron’s  failure.  This  result 
confirms that foreign institutional investor perceived Big 4 as the suppliers of audit quality 
even after Enron failure at the end of 2001. 
The  remainder  of  this  paper  is  organised  as  follows.  Section  2  describes  the  legal  audit 




































0choice  of  auditors  and  the  characteristics  of  institutional  investors  in  France.    Section  4 
presents the sample and methodology, and section 5 shows the empirical results. The last 
section summarizes the empirical findings and serves as a conclusion.  
2. The failure of Enron and the audit profession in France 
The Enron Corporation was founded in 1985. The main activity of this corporation was the 
distribution of natural gas by pipeline in the United States (Helay and Palepu, 2003). Between 
1987  and  1990  Enron  was  the  leader  in  this  field.  On  December  31,  2000,  the  market 
capitalization of Enron was about 60 billion dollars. Arthur Houston Office was the auditor of 
Enron. This audit firm was one of the two largest Americans financial services. The income 
of  this  auditor  group  was  9.3  billion  dollars,  46%  coming  from  the  American  market. 
Furthermore, this group had 81 offices in the United States and 85,000 employees throughout 
the world (Jan Barton 2005) and 28000 in United States. 
At the end of 2001, when the failure of Enron was announced and Arthur Andersen L.L.P 
destroyed  the large number of  Enron documents and  computer files.  The Federal Energy 
Regulatory  Commission  began  investigating  if  Enron  and  other  energy  trading  had 
manipulated the California electricity market between 2000 and 2001. Three major reactions 
were noted. The first one concerns the reaction of the market. According to many researchers, 
Enron‘s failure and the role of Andersen affected financial markets and the confidence of 
investors. Chaney and Philipich (2002) investigated the effect of Enron’s audit failure on the 
reputation of Arthur Andersen’s clients through the negative effects on stock prices. They 
found  that  Andersen’s  clients  suffered  from  a  significant  negative  reaction  during  key 
disclosure concerning Enron and Andersen relation. Callen and Morel (2002) compared the 
daily stock returns of Andersen’s clients on a control sample of other Big 5 auditors’ clients 
between October 2001 and January 2002. They showed that in the month when the failure of 
Enron  was  announced,  Andersen’s  brand  name  was  negatively  affected.  Krishnamurthy, 
Zhou, and Zhou (2002) found that the market reacted more negatively than when the news 
about Andersen was announced. Moreover, they note that the market reacted more negatively 
to Andersen‘s clients than to other Big 4 auditors’ clients. Cahan and Zhang (2006) studied 
the reaction of the share prices of Andersen’s customers outside the United States (521 clients 
in 38  different countries).  They found  that the share  prices  of Andersen’s clients  reacted 




































0The second reaction concerns the Big 4 brand name: the Big 4 group lost their reputation after 
the Enron scandal. These advanced studies concerning the market reaction singled out the 
lack of trust in the Big 4’s audit services. This situation can decrease the part of large audit 
firm in audit services. This due to the lack of investor trusting associated to big brand name 
after Enron collapse. The third reaction concerns the legal sector. In July 2002, the United 
States  Congress  adopted  the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act.  This  law  established  new  control 
procedures and created a new organism called Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB). The same act was adopted in France in 2003. This security act established a new 
organism  called  “Haut  Commissariat  aux  Comptes”  which  guarantees  the  auditor’s 
independence.  
3. Audit quality and characteristics of institutional investors 
Most of recent studies show that audit is an important mechanism of corporate governance. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) demonstrated that audit reduces the likelihood of information 
asymmetries between investors and managers. Palmrose (1988) found that the audit report is a 
key  factor  in  the  reaction  of  the  market.  But  this  depends  on  the  auditor’s  reputation. 
Theoretical and empirical backgrounds detected the differences in audit practices between 
large and small audit firms. For this reason, recent studies dealt with the concept of audit 
quality. DeAngelo (1981) defines audit quality as the probability that the auditor will both 
detect  and  report  a  breach  in  the  contract  to  provide  fair  accounting  information. 
Independence and competence are two main characteristics of audit quality. All the latest 
research on audit quality confirms that the Big 4 offer audit quality more than small audit 
firms. Becker et al. (1998) demonstrated that firms audited by the Big 4 benefit from better 




































0example, the Big 4 have the human and financial resources. These two factors affect auditor’s 
skills.
Prior archival audit studies focused on the demand for auditing (DeFond, 1992; Francis and 
Wilson,  1988;  Watts  and  Zimmerman,  1986)  demonstrate  that  the  ownership  structure 
influences the choice of auditors. In recent studies, Guedhami and Pittman (2006) find no 
evidence that auditor choice reduce ownership concentration in international analyses over 31 
countries.  Wang,  et  al. (2008)  studied the choice  of  auditors  in  China.  Empirical  results 
showed  that  State  Owned  Enterprises  and  non  State  Owned  Enterprises  appoint  small 
auditors. In the same context, Jun Lin and Liu (2009) treat the choice of auditor during a 
period of 2001- 2004. They found that chines firms with large controlling shareholders are 
less  to  hire  Top  10  auditors.  Ashbaugh  and  Warfield  (2003)  studied  audit  demand  in 
Germany. They found a positive relationship between ownership dispersion and audit quality. 
Lenox (2005) investigated the relation between audit quality and management ownership in 
the United Kingdom. He found a negative correlation between shares held by managers and 
audit quality.
Various  works  examine  the  link  between  manager  ownership  and  audit  quality.  But  in 
practice, we distinguish the presence of institutional investors in the ownership structure. This 
group of shareholders is characterized by their ability to carry out financial analysis and their 
needs for information quality. Since the end of 1990, institutional investors have adopted 
active monitoring hypotheses in corporate organisations, and in many countries throughout 
the world (Gillan and Starks 2000). Otherwise, the presence of institutional investor became 
the important characteristic of financial market. For example, the public pension fund began 
to abandon their traditional monitoring role and became more active in corporate governance. 
This  role  increase  when  the  conflict  of  interest is  very  significant  between  manager  and 
shareholders. The institutional investors use their ownership to pressure manager to act in the 
best  of  the  shareholders.  Maug  (1998)  notes  that  the  decision  of  institutional  investor  is 
partially a function of share held by this group of investor. McConnell and Servaes (1990) 
find  that  the  ownership  of  institutional  investor  is  positively  associated  to  the  firm 
performance measured by the Tobin’s Q. Generally, major of last researches confirm this 
relation. Contrary to this conclusion, Chen et al. (2006) suggests that institutional investors 
(pension  funds,  insurance  companies,  mutual  funds)  provide  little  monitoring  in  China 




































0According to the security Rule, the institutional investor are composed from banks, insurance 
companies, mutual funds and pension funds (Bushee, 1998). 
The presence of institutional investors in the ownership structure influences the way in which 
activity is monitored in the corporation. As a whole, institutional investors try to control their 
investment. They are the most informed about the corporation‘s situation. To evaluate their 
portfolio choice, institutional investors needs credible accounting information. The annual 
report is the main source of credible information. Prior studies found that audit report and 
financial  statements  provided  a  clear  signal  on  firm  health  and  performance  (Dye,  1993; 
Willenborg,  1999;  O’Reilly,  Leitch  and  Tuttle,  2006).  This  signal  influences  the  market 
reaction  and  depends  from  auditor  brand  name  and  audit  firm  reputation.  As  has  been 
demonstrated  by  previous  research,  Big  4  audit  firms  are  considered  as  firms  offering 
satisfying audit quality. For this reason, institutional investors hire the Big 4. Carcello et al. 
(2002) and Abott et al.(2003) suggest that audit quality presented by big audit firm mitigate 
agency cost and the likelihood of irregular and fraudulent financial statement. 
We note that French corporations are family- owned or belong to individual shareholders 
(Lakhel 2006). According to the agency theory, information asymmetries will appear between 
shareholders in this case. Institutional investors choose the Big 4 to reduce agency problems. 
Furthermore, France suffers from a lack of investor protection (La Porta et al. 1998). It is for 
this reason that the perception of foreign institutional investor is not the same as that of the 
French institutional investor. Hay and Knechel (2004) argued that the audit demanding rose 
when stakeholders were placed in the security environment characterized by the lack of legal 
protection. This point of view increases the role of big audit firm in the civil law countries and 
some  emerging  market  characterized  by  the  immature  of  financial  security  system.  For 
example, Ting et al. (2009) treated the influence of qualified foreign institutional investor 
(QFII) on the association between default risk and audit opinion in China. They found that 
QFII have a greater pressure on auditor to issue audit opinions with greater prudence. Several 
studies demonstrated that institutional investors are active monitor (Wall Street Journal, 1995, 
1996, 1997). This monitor increase when the environment is characterized by the less legal 
protection. In this way, Kane and Velury (2004) find that the greater the level of institutional 
ownership, the more likely it is that a firm choose audit service from a large audit firm in 
order to ensure high audit quality. Institutional investors have a material resource and law 
skills to against auditor when this last certify irregular financial statement. They influence 




































0L.L.P in Enron‘s failure has been very clear. The Big 4 auditors lost their reputation after the 
Enron scandal. We test the following two hypotheses: 
H1: After the Enron scandal, institutional investor ownership is negatively associated with 
the choice of the Big 4.
H2: After the Enron scandal, the presence of the foreign institutional investor is negatively 
associated with the choice of the Big 4 in France. 
4. Method
4.1 Sample selection
The sample selected is composed of 144 French enterprises listed on SBF 250. Three criteria 
have been adopted for the selection sample in this study. First, every identified corporation 
must have all interest variables in Thomason Financial data bases over 2000-2007. Second, 
every corporation must have its annual reports available to identify the institutional investor’s 
ownerships and their nationality. Third, banks, insurance companies and financial enterprises 
are excluded due to their accounting specificities and financial legislation. If we apply these 
conditions we find 144 French corporations examined over a period of six years, from 2000 to 




































0Table 1: Sample characteristic
Regression Model and Variables definition
Following prior research, our regression model is as follows: 
If   0< Big 4≤2;     Big 4= 1
                                                If     Big 4< 1   ,     Big 4= 0
Probit Regression   
Big 4 = α0 + β1INST + β2 NAT + β3 LTD + β4 ASTR+ β5AGE + β6 SIZE +    
       β7 SIZE
2 + β8 GRW + β9 T RISK + β10O RISK + β11 MOM + β12 ROA + ζ
Dependent variable 
Big 4: Dummy variable, which equal 1 if one of the two legal auditors is one of the Big 4 
network, 0 otherwise; 
Sector                                                                                Worldscope Code              N
Automotive                                                                                 1900                         6
Construction                                                                               2800                          6
Chemicals , Drugs, Cosmetics and Health Care                   3400-2500                      8
Electrical                                                                                    3720                          8 
Electronics                                                                                  4000                        18
Food                                                                                       4600-2200                     6
Metal, Oil and Gaz                                                                5500-5800                      9
Recreation                                                                                   6700                          7
Retailers                                                                                      7000                          8
Service Organisations                                                            8580-8510                    31
Wholesalers                                                                                 8591                        14
Textiles                                                                                         7300                         2
Transportation                                                                              7900                         4                                                                                   
Others                                                                                          3100                        17  





































INST: Major institutional ownership percentage;
NAT:  Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the nationality of the institutional investor is not 
French, 0 otherwise;
Control variables 
LTD: Long term debt to total assets;
ASTR: Gross, property, plant   and equipment to total assets; 
Age: Corporation age since the date of foundation
Size: Natural logarithm of total assets; 
Size
2: Size square; 
GRW: (Total sales of next year divided by the total sales of current years) -1; 
T Risk: Total risk (see Appendix 1);
O Risk: Operating risk (see Appendix 1); 
MOM: Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the firm is listed on more then one market, 0 
otherwise; 
ROA: Return on assets; 
ζ: Errors terms. 
We only use one stage in this study. According to prior studies, our dependent variable (Big 
4) is a dummy variable, 1 if one of the two legal auditors is one of Big 4, 0 otherwise. We 
note that French context is present his specificities compared to the others context. Listed 
companies must appoint two different auditors to assure the legal mission. To test our two 
hypotheses, we use the percentage of capital held by the institutional investor in the first 
hypotheses, and then we use the dummy variable, 1 if the institutional investor is foreign, 0 
otherwise to test our second hypothesis 
Control variables 
Focusing on previous research we use variables related to firm characteristics in our model. 
Building on the study of Broy and Weill (2008), we use long term debt (LTD) to control the 
effect of credit organism on the choice of auditor. The latest empirical studies found a positive 




































0Willson 1988; Eichenscher and Shield 1989; DeFond 1992; Reed et al. 2000). In addition, in 
our model we use assets structure (ASTR) to control auditor expertise. Besides we use three 
measures of agency problem. We use size (Size,  log of total assets), size square because 
Lenox (2005) found a non linear association between size and auditor choice, growth (GRW, 
Sales variation) and square roots of employers number. But we exclude the latest because we 
find a high positive correlation between this variable and size. This correlation can affect the 
regression result. Wang, Q and al. (2008) show that growth is not associated to non-Big 4 
firms in China. In the same context, Wang, Q and al. (2008) found a significant relation 
between small auditors and firm size. Risk is another factor that can affect the choice of an 
auditor. We use two measures of risk. The first one concern operating risk (O RISK) and the 
second is total risk (T RISK) (Piot 2001).  Palmarose (1988) showed that firms audited by the 
Big 4 had a lower risk of litigation. Furthermore, we use the age (AGE) of the corporation to 
control the effect of culture on auditor choice. Following Asbaught and Warfield (2003), we 
coded 1 when the firm is listed on more than one financial market (MOM), 0 otherwise. 
Finally, we use return on assets (ROA) as an additional indicator of firm risk. 
5. Results
5.1 Descriptive statistics and Univariate analyses 
                                                           Insert Table 2 
Table  (2)  shows  the  descriptive  statistics  of  the  sample  from  2000  to  2007.  Companies 
audited by the Big 4 firms represent 73.33% of the sample. This result confirms that the 
French audit market is dominated by the Big 4 audit firms. Table (3) reports the distribution 
of the Big 4 audit market between 2000 and 2007. The distribution demonstrates that Ernest 
Young Audit Firm control 29.3% of the audit legal mission confides to Big 4 audit firm in our 
sample. Focusing in this distribution, we found Deloitte & Touche coming in the second rank 
with 26% and KPMG in the third rank with 25.3%. Finally, the small part of the legal audit 
mission is confided to Price Waterhouse Coopers with 19% from 2000 to 2007. Table (4) 
reports the distribution of Big 4 legal audit mission by activity sector.  In metal, oil and gas 
sector, Deloitte & Touche, Ernest & Young and KPMG Corporation have the same market 
proportion  from  2005  to  2007.  Contrary  to  the  other  sector,  Price  Waterhouse  Coopers 




































0through the eight years. In the recreation sector, Ernest & Young control 40% and the three 
other leaders detained 60% with 20% for every audit firm in 2007.
Table 3: The distribution of the Big 4 audit market from 2000 to 2007
Insert Table 4
Focusing on the  table (2) associated  to the descriptive statistics; the institutional investor 
ownership detained approximately 26% of the total equity of our sample. We note that the 
French institutional investor is higher in the case of the enterprises audited by non-Big 4 audit 
firm than the corporations audited by the large audit firm. More than 50% of French listed 
companies  have  more  than  20%  of  their  equity  controlled  by  institutional investor.  The 
maximum of the institutional investor ownership exceed 95% in the case of Provimi and 
Société de la Tour d’Eiffel in 2000. Summarize descriptive statistics (table 5) before and after 
Enron scandal demonstrate the decrease of the French institutional investor ownership in the 
enterprises audited by Big 4 and the increase of this percentage in the enterprises audited by 
non-Big 4. Univariate analysis presented in the table (6) shows that there is no difference in 
the mean and in the median between French institutional ownership in the enterprises audited 
by the Big 4 and the non-Big 4 (t-test = 0.282) before Enron collapse. This situation is not the 
case after Enron scandal. Univariate analysis confirms the differences in the mean and in the 
median of the French institutional investor after Enron failure. This means that the perception 
of French institutional investor was changed to large audit firm. T-student and Wilcoxan two 
sample tests are positively significant at 5% after Enron scandal in the case of the French 
institutional investor ownership. This is due to Arthur Andersen L.L.P role in Enron scandal. 
We note also, that the mean of the French institutional investor increase in the case of the 
firms  audited  by  non-Big  4  audit  firms  compared to  Big  4  firms  after  Enron  period. 
Otherwise, after the Enron scandal, we can see the decrease of French institutional investor 
ownership in the firms audited by the Big 4 compared to the post Enron failure. 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Deloitte & Touche  0.24 0.24 0.24 0.26 0.29 0.27 0.27 0.27
Ernest & Young  0.29 0.28 0.30 0.32 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.30
KPMG 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.24 0.24 0.26 0.26 0.25




































0Table 5: Summarize Descriptive statistics before and after Enron scandal
Contrary  to  the  French  institutional  investor,  the  percentage  of  the  foreign  institutional 
investor institutional investor in the case of the enterprises audited by large audit firm exceeds 
the percentage of the enterprises audited by non-Big 4 before and Enron collapse. This mean 
that foreign institutional investor perceive large audit firm that firms that have the ability to 
control  international  corporations.  The  size  of  corporation  justifies  this  finding.  The 
descriptive statistics demonstrate that the size of the corporate audited by large audit firm is 
more than the firm audited by non-Big 4. More than 50% of the corporations audited by Big 4 
have their total assets exceed 1 million euro. This amount is equal to 622 thousand euro in the 
case of firms audited by non-Big 4. The same conclusion is for asset structure. The mean of 
gross, property and equipment for the firm audited by Big 4 is equal to 18% of the total assets 
and 14.9% for the firm controlled by the small audit firm through the sample between 2000 
and 2007. Focusing on summarize descriptive statistics before and after Enron collapse, we 
note that the percentage of the foreign institutional investor increase after Enron failure. This 
percentage passed from 25.6% before Enron scandal to 28.9% in the firms audited by Big 4 
after  Enron  failure.  This  remark  demonstrates  that  the  perception  of  foreign  institutional 
investor in French context does not affected by Enron failure and Andersen role.  Univariate 
analysis demonstrates this finding. The result shows that there is a difference in ownership of 
foreign institutional investor at the levels of 10% and 5% before and after Enron scandal. 
Contrary to the French major institutional investor, the foreign institutional investor continued 
to  appreciate  the  audit  quality  of  the  Big  4  group  in  France.  This  result  shows  that  the 
perception of foreign institutions to Big 4 services did not changed after Arthur Andersen’s 
failure. This result demonstrate that foreign institutional investor see the Big 4 as the suppliers 
Before Enron scandal
              Big 4                                 Non-Big 4
After Enron scandal
                Big 4                             Non-Big 4
   Mean       Median       Mean            Median      Mean        Median      Mean            Median
Inst 0.256           0.238 0.263               0.151       0.247           0.181       0.294                 0.249
Nat 0.256              0        0.177                 0       0.289              0       0.198                    0
Ltd 0.333          0.142       0.577               0.141       0.223           0.156 0.391                 0.148
Astr 0.187          0.139        0.156               0.120       0.177           0.117 0.142                 0.102
Size 13.89          13.58        13.79               13.32       14.36           14.09 13.60                 13.37
Grw 0.212          0.121        0.211              0.145       0.111           0.600 0.115                 0.069
T Risk 0.872          0.024      0.092                0.022       0.304           0.021 0.072                0.025
O Risk 0.322          0.222       0.301                0.201       0.299           0.136 0.269                0.138
MOM 0.286            0       0.128                  0       0.346              0       0.143                    0




































0of audit quality much then small audit firms. This perception is as a function of the audit role 
in every country. For example the role of audit in Anglo-Saxon courtiers is considered as a 
mechanism of insurance (deep-pocket theory). We note, that foreign institutional investor in 
our sample coming generally from Anglo-Saxon countries. US investor and Canadian investor 
are coming in the first rank in French context between 2000 and 2007 in our sample.  
The mean of the leverage ratio is equal to 14.8 % of the sample (table 1). The leverage ratio 
before and after Enron collapse of the enterprises audited by the non-Big 4 is more than the 
firms audited by Big 4. We document that the leverage level of the enterprises audited by the 
two leaders decrease. We note also, that more than the half of the enterprises audited by Big 4 
has their age more than 33 years old.  The mean of the growth sales of the firms audited by 
small audit firms is equal to 16%. 50 % of the corporations audited by large audit firm have 
the percentage less of the 74.30%. 26.9% of the firms of our sample are listed on more one 
market. For the firms audited by Big 4, this percentage is equal to 32.6% and only 13.6 % for 
the firms audited by non-Big 4. The mean of the return on assets of the all sample is equal to 
5.6%. For the total risk, we note that is approximately the same for corporation audited by the 




Insert Table 8 
The limit of our univariate analysis is that it ignores a number of control variables that can 
affect our result, for this reason we performed multivariate analyses. Table 5 reports results 
from a probit regression in which the dependent variable equals one if one of the two auditors 
is one of the Big 4 audit firms, 0 otherwise, and table 6 reports the marginal effect.  We use 
the Probit method because French laws oblige listed enterprises to choose two auditors. R 
squared is equal to 7.7% for the first model (before Enron scandal) and 9% after the Enron 
scandal model. The two models are significant at 1%. The first result concerns the relation 




































0the Enron scandal. We note that the link between the choice of the Big 4 and institutional 
investors is negative and statistically significant after the Enron scandal at 5% (p=0.029). This 
empirical result shows that the perception of the Big 4 by institutional investors changed after 
the Enron scandal. This result means that the trust and the confidence of French institutional 
investors  decreased  after  the  Enron  scandal  and  Arthur  Andersen’s  failure  in  2002.  The 
marginal effects before the Enron scandal demonstrate that the increase of 1% in institutional 
investors  increases  the probability to choose one of Big 4by 1.08%.  This confirms  that, 
before the Enron scandal, institutional investors researched financial statements certified by 
the Big 4audit firms. This result is not the same after the Enron scandal. After the despaired  
of Arthur Andersen’s L.L.P on the audit firm, the increase of 1% in major French institutional 
investors  decreased  the  probability  to  choose  one  of  the  Big  4by  17.59%.  This  provides 
support for our first hypothesis.  
Our second hypothesis deals with the foreign institutional investor. Empirical results show 
that  there  is  a  positive  and  statistically  insignificant  link  between  foreign  institutional 
investors and the Big 4 appointment before (t = 0.365) and after the Enron collapse (t=0.804). 
These findings demonstrate that the perception of the foreign institutional investor was not 
affected by the Enron scandal and Arthur Andersen‘s role in this scandal at the end of 2002 in 
France.  In conclusion, our second hypothesis associated to the relation between the foreign 
institutional investor and the appointment of large audit firms is not supported in the context 
that characterized by the lack of investor protection compared to common Low Countries 
according to La Porta et al. (1999). This means that the perception of the institutional investor 
is a function of the audit role in every context. For example in the United States and Canada, 
audit is conceived as the insurance mechanism in the deep-pocket theory (Piot, 2005). 
Some control variables are significant associated to the choice of the Big 4 after the Enron 
scandal in France. On the first hand, long term is negatively and significantly associated to the 
choice of the Big 4 at 10% after Enron collapse. This empirical result shows the perception 
banks have of the annual reports certified by the Big 4 audit firms in France. This provides 
evidence demonstrate that the Big 4 lost the confidence of banks after the Enron scandal. 
Otherwise,  banking agencies  are  coming  more  prudent  in  the  use  of  the  certified  annual 
reports.  This  result  is  different  from  the  result  obtained  by  Ashbaught  and  Warfield  in 
Germany. Piot (2001, 2005) found that long term debt is insignificantly negatively correlated 




































0the  same  way,  Fan  and  Wong  (2005)  found  that  long  term  is  insignificantly  negatively 
associated to the choice of the Big 4 only in South Korea and Singapore.   
The age of the company   is negatively and significantly associated to the Big 4 at 5% only 
before the Enron scandal. This means that young French corporations chose the Big 4 before 
2002 to demonstrate their financial statement credibility and signal their private information 
on the financial market. When the age of the firm increase with one year, the probability to 
choice one of the large audit companies reduce by 0.12%.  After Enron collapse, the age 
variable is insignificant associated to the Big 4 choice. 
Asset structure is another variable that affects the choice of an auditor in France before and 
after Enron’s failure at 5%. This empirical  result demonstrates  that a high level of  gross 
property and equipment increases the probability of hiring one auditor of the Big 4. But after 
the Arthur Andersen’s L.L.P in Enron Collapse, the marginal effect decreased by 3% the 
choice of one of the Big 4 (36.66% before Enron and 33.02% after Enron). Contrary to asset 
structure, size is positively and significant related to the choice of the Big 4 at 5% only after 
the  Enron  scandal.  This  empirical  finding  shows  that  the  French  corporations  that  have 
agency problem in their organisation tend to choose a big audit firm after 2002. Previous 
research shows that the Big 4 reduce agency problem and asymmetries information in firms. 
Even more, operating risk is positively and significantly correlated to the choice of the Big 4. 
This empirical result means that, in France, the corporations which have operating risks hire 
the Big 4 before after Enron’s failure. Moreover, the firms listed on more than one financial 
market are positively and significantly associated to the choice of the Big 4 before and after 
Arthur Andersen’s scandal. This means that if the firm is listed on more than one financial 
market, the probability of hiring one of the Big 4 decreased with 18%. The marginal effect of 
firms listed on more than one market decreased by 5% after the Enron scandal. Total risk is 
negatively and insignificant associated to the choice of the Big 4 before and before and after 
the Enron scandal, this result is consistent with previous research. Palmrose (1988) showed 
that the firms audited by the Big 4 had a lower risk of litigation. Return on assets is negatively 
and insignificantly related to the choice of the Big 4, which is the same result as the result 
obtained by Broy and Weill (2008). This result suggests that firms appointing the Big 4 are 





































Through the world, large audit firms or Big 4 are considered the suppliers of audit quality. 
Most  of previous research confirms  this result. Becker et  al. (1998)  found that the firms 
audited by the Big 4 had lower discretionary accruals in the United States than the firms 
audited by the Non-Big 4. Palmrose (1988) reported that the audits by the Big 4 (ex-Big 8) 
were  less likely to  result  in litigation.  To  sum up,  according to the  latest  research,  audit 
quality is related to the Big 4 brand name. 
At the end of 2001, when Enron’s failure was announced, the role of Arthur Andersen L.L.P, 
one of the largest financial services through the world, in this scandal was very significant. 
Three  reactions  were  noted  after  this  scandal.  The  first  one  concerns  the  reaction  of  the 
market.  Most  financial  markets  reacted  negatively  after  the  Enron  collapse.  The  second 
reaction was associated to the auditor’s brand name. It means that the Big 4 audit firms lost 
their reputation after Arthur Andersen’s L.L.P role in Enron scandal after 2002. Third, the 
reaction  concerns  legislative  environment.  After  this  failure,  many  countries  adopted  the 
Financial  Security  Acts.  For  example,  United  States  adopted  the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  to 
reinforce corporate governance after 2002. France created the “Loi de la sécurité financière” 
in  2003  and  established  the“Haut  Commissariat  aux  Comptes”  to  guarantee  the 
independence  of auditors.  The purpose  of  this paper  is to  study the  relation  between the 
choice of an auditor and the characteristics of institutional investors after the Enron scandal in 
French context that characterized by their specificities in audit domain.   
Empirical findings show that the perception of the French institutional investor is negatively 
and significantly associated to the choice of the Big 4 at 5%. This means that the brand name 
of Big 4 was discredited after the Enron scandal in France. Contrary to French institutional 
investors,  the  link  between  the  foreign  institutional  investor  remained  positive  and 
insignificant  in  a  country  that  was  qualified  as  the  country  that  has  a  lack  of  investor 
protection (La Porta et al. 1998). The dummy variable associated to the listed companies on 
more one market confirms that foreign institutional investor have the different perception to 
large audit firms compared to the French institutional investor. This result confirms that an 
audit services varies from every context. In the same context, empirical results show that even 
after the Enron scandal, the  Big 4 continue to reduce agency problem in French corporations. 
However, firm with high tangible assets still appointed the Big 4 after the Arthur Andersen’s 




































0intangible assets. This finding is justified in Resource Based View theory and can affect the 
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0Table 2: Descriptive statistics
                                                                                               (144 entreprises) 
                            All sample                                      Big 4 Non-Big 4
       Mean            sd           Min      Median          Max        Mean            sd
     
          Min        Median         Max       Mean            sd
     
          Min        Median          Max
      Big 4 0,733 0,442 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
INST 0.259 0.226 0.000 0.200 0.990 0.247 0.217 0.000 0.181 0.883 0.289 0.238 0.000 0.236 0.935
NAT 0.251 0.434 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.281 0.450 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.191 0.394 0.000 1.000 0.000
LTD 0,325 1,782 0.000 0,148 44.109 0,259 1,611 0.000 0,149 44,109 0,479 1,946 0.000 0.147 22.255
  ASTR 0.173 0.161 0.000 0.0001 0,977 0,180 0.166 0.0001 0,123 0,977 0,149 0,144 0,001 0,002 0,942
  AGE 50.284 54.204 0.000 32 342 49.360 52.188 0.000 33 342 52.456 58.689 0.000 31 337
  SIZE 14,047 2,116 8,634 13,677 18,660 14,209 2,118 8,755 13,863 18,660 13,665 2.064 8.634 13.341 18.186
GRW 0,149 0,336 -0,743 0,077 3,920 0,145 0,344 -0,743 0,743 3,920 0,160 0,318 -0,614 0.090 3.630
    T RISK 0.300 0.403 0.001 0.164 2.959 0.306 0.413 0.001 0.169 2.959 0.284 0.380 0.001 0.160 2.002
    ORISK 0.370 2.302 0.000 0.022 34.665 0.493 2.735 0.000 0.022 34.665 0.081 0.261 0.000 0.024 2.352
      MOM 0,269 0.444 0.000 0.000 1.000 0,326 0,469 0.000 0.000 1.000 0,136 0.343 0.000 0.000 1
ROA 0.056 0,442 -5,702 0,035 7,323 0,326 0,301 -5,701 0,033 3.238 0,102 0.663 -4.572 0.037 7.323
Big 4: Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the auditor is one of the Big Four, 0 otherwise; INST: Major institutional ownership percentage; NAT: Dummy variable, which equals 1 if 
the nationality of institutional is foreign, 0 otherwise; LRD: Long term debt to total assets; ASTR: Gross Property Plant and Equipment to total assets; AGE: Corporation age since the 
foundation date; SIZE: Natural logarithm of total assets; SIZE
2: Square of size; GRW: (Total sales of next year divided by total sales of current year) -1; T RISK: Total risk (see 




































0Table 4: Distribution of legal audit mission in the data 
Sector Activity  Auditeurs  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Automotive Deloitte & Touche  0,14 0,14 0,14 0,14 0,14 0,14 0,14 0,14
Ernest & Young  0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29
KPMG 0,14 0,14 0,14 0,14 0,14 0,14 0,14 0,14
PWH 0,43 0,43 0,43 0,43 0,43 0,43 0,43 0,43
Construction  Deloitte & Touche  0,50 0,50 0,50 0,57 0,57 0,50 0,50 0,50
Ernest & Young  0,33 0,17 0,17 0,14 0,14 0,13 0,13 0,11
KPMG 0,17 0,17 0,17 0,14 0,14 0,25 0,25 0,33
PWH 0,00 0,17 0,17 0,14 0,14 0,13 0,13 0,11
Chimicals  Deloitte & Touche  0,00 0,00 0,13 0,13 0,18 0,18 0,25 0,25
Ernest & Young  0,29 0,29 0,25 0,25 0,27 0,27 0,25 0,25
KPMG 0,43 0,43 0,38 0,38 0,27 0,27 0,25 0,25
PWH 0,29 0,29 0,25 0,25 0,27 0,27 0,25 0,25
Electronics  Deloitte & Touche  0,31 0,31 0,29 0,25 0,24 0,18 0,18 0,18
Ernest & Young  0,31 0,31 0,29 0,38 0,35 0,35 0,35 0,35
KPMG 0,23 0,23 0,29 0,25 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,24
PWH 0,15 0,15 0,14 0,13 0,12 0,18 0,18 0,24
Electrical Deloitte & Touche  0,43 0,43 0,38 0,33 0,30 0,30 0,27 0,27
Ernest & Young  0,14 0,14 0,25 0,33 0,30 0,40 0,36 0,36
KPMG 0,14 0,14 0,13 0,11 0,20 0,20 0,27 0,27
PWH 0,29 0,29 0,25 0,22 0,20 0,10 0,09 0,09
Food  Deloitte & Touche  0,00 0,00 0,00 0,17 0,17 0,17 0,17 0,17
Ernest & Young  0,00 0,00 0,20 0,17 0,17 0,17 0,17 0,17
KPMG 0,50 0,50 0,40 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33
PWH 0,50 0,50 0,40 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33
Metal Oil Gaz  Deloitte & Touche  0,17 0,17 0,17 0,29 0,33 0,30 0,27 0,27
Ernest & Young  0,50 0,50 0,50 0,43 0,33 0,30 0,27 0,27
KPMG 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,29 0,22 0,30 0,27 0,27
PWH 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,11 0,10 0,18 0,18
Recreation  Deloitte & Touche  0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,20 0,20 0,20 0,20
Ernest & Young  0,60 0,60 0,60 0,57 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,40
KPMG 0,20 0,20 0,20 0,29 0,20 0,20 0,20 0,20
PWH 0,20 0,20 0,20 0,14 0,20 0,20 0,20 0,20
(Relailers)Distribution Deloitte & Touche  0,20 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33
Ernest & Young  0,10 0,11 0,22 0,22 0,11 0,11 0,11 0,11
KPMG 0,60 0,56 0,44 0,44 0,44 0,44 0,44 0,44
PWH 0,10 0,11 0,11 0,11 0,11 0,11 0,11 0,11
Services  Deloitte & Touche  0,17 0,16 0,16 0,19 0,31 0,33 0,33 0,32
Ernest & Young  0,44 0,42 0,42 0,43 0,35 0,33 0,30 0,32
KPMG 0,11 0,16 0,21 0,19 0,19 0,19 0,20 0,19
PWH 0,28 0,26 0,21 0,19 0,15 0,15 0,17 0,16
Wolesalers Deloitte & Touche  0,17 0,17 0,17 0,14 0,14 0,09 0,09 0,09
Ernest & Young  0,00 0,00 0,00 0,14 0,14 0,27 0,27 0,36
KPMG 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,57 0,57 0,55 0,55 0,45
PWH 0,17 0,17 0,17 0,14 0,14 0,09 0,09 0,09
Textil Deloitte & Touche  0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Ernest & Young  0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50
KPMG 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
PWH 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50
Transport Deloitte & Touche  1,00 1,00 1,00 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,67
Ernest & Young  0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
KPMG 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33
PWH 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Others  Deloitte & Touche  0,38 0,38 0,38 0,42 0,38 0,33 0,31 0,31
Ernest & Young  0,50 0,50 0,50 0,42 0,38 0,42 0,46 0,46
KPMG 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08




































0Table 6: Univariate Analyses 
                                                       Before Enron (2000-2002)                                                                    After Enron (2003-2007)
   
                                        Big 4 (A)                    Non-Big 4 (B)              Diff. Test (B-A)                     Big 4 (A)                      Non-Big 4 (B)               Diff. Test (B-A)
            
                                 Mean             Median           Mean             Median          t-stat       z-stat                     Mean              Median         Mean           Median          t-stat          z-stat
Institutional Ownership       0.256               0.238           0.263               0.151            0.282      -0.029                   0.247               0.181            0.294            0.249           2.427**     2.032**
Institutional Investor 
Nationality                            0.256              0.000            0.177               0.000          -1.894*   -1.888*                  0.289               0.000            0.198        0.000              -2.389**     -2.381**
***, ** and *denote significance at p< 0.001, 0.05 and 0.1 respectively. 
Institutional Ownership:  Major institutional ownership percentage.
           Institutional Investor Nationality: Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the nationality of institutional is foreign, 0 otherwise. 
t-stat: Test of the differences of the mean between two independent samples; 




































0TABLE 7: Estimations Results Post and After Enron Scandal 
Method: Probit Regression 
Dependent variable: Big 4 
              Big 4 = α0 + β1INST + β2 NAT + β3 LTD + β4 ASTR+ β5AGE + β6 SIZE    
                                + β7 Size
2 + β8 GRW + β9 T RISK + β10O RISK + β11 MOM 
                                + β12 ROA + ζ
                                                                      Estimates results 
                                          Post Enron (2000-2002)                                        After Enron (2003-2007)
    
    Variable                Parameter                                                            Parameter
     Name                  Estimate          t-statistics      p-value                   Estimate        t-statistics          p-value    
   
    Intercept                0.4443                0.90              0.371                     -5.5825              -2.19                  0.029 
    INST                      0.3129                0.11              0.912                     -0.6324              -2.69                 0.007
    NAT                       0.1474                0.91              0.365                      0.0325                0.25                0.804 
    LTD                      -0.0286              -1.24               0.213                    -0.1953               -1.77                0.077
    ASTR                     1.0544               2.25               0.025                     1.1872                 2.88                0.004
    AGE                      -0.0036              -2.66               0.008                    -0.0011               -0.98                0.328 
    Size                       -0.0192              -0.60               0.549                     0.8172                 2.28                0.023 
    Size
2                      -0.0001              -1.05               0.294                    -0.0265                -2.11               0.035 
    GRW                      0.0069               0.04                0.972                     0.1717                0.89                0.373 
    T RISK                 -0.2333             -1.11                0.267                   -0.0733                -0.45                 0.649 
    O RISK                  0.4852               2.66                0.008                     0.8503                 2.68                0.007 
    MOM                     0.5992               3.37                0.001                     0.5511                 3.91                0.000
    ROA                     -0.0255             -0.19                0.849                    -0.2397                 -0.95               0.341
Number of observation                     432                                                                           720                            
Rsquared                                           7.70%                                                                      9.00%
LR (12)                                             44.11                                                                       73.08




































0TABLE 8: Marginal Effect Post and After Enron Scandal
Dependent variable: Big 4 
              Big 4 = α0 + β1INST + β2 NAT + β3 LTD + β4 ASTR+ β5AGE + β6 SIZE    
                                + β7 Size
2 + β8 GRW + β9 T RISK + β10O RISK + β11 MOM 
                                + β12 ROA + ζ
                                                                      Marginal effect results 
                                          Post Enron (2000-2002)                                      After Enron (2003-2007)
       
    Variable                Parameter                                                            Parameter
     Name                  Estimate          t-statistics      p-value                   Estimate        t-statistics       p-value    
   
    INST                      0.0108                0.11              0.912                   -0.1759                 -2.69                0.007
    NAT                       0.0500                0.91              0.365                    0.0089                  0.25                0.804
    LTD                      -0.0993              -1.24               0.213                   -0.0543                -1.77                0.077
    ASTR                     0.3661               2.25               0.025                    0.3302                  2.88                0.004
    AGE                      -0.0012              -2.66               0.008                  -0.0003                 -0.98               0.328
    Size                       -0.0066              -0.60               0.549                    0.2273                  2.28               0.023
    Size
2                      -0.0000              -1.05               0.294                   -0.0073                -2.11               0.035
    GRW                      0.0024               0.04                0.972                   0.0477                  0.89               0.373
    T RISK                 -0.0810              -1.11                0.267                  -0.0203                 -0.45               0.649
    O RISK                  0.1684               2.66                0.008                    0.2365                 2.68               0.007
    MOM                     0.1868               3.37                0.001                    0.1383                  3.91               0.000
    ROA                      -0.0088              -0.19               0.849                   -0.0666                -0.95               0.341
   Number of observation                     432                                                                           720                            
Rsquared                                           7.70%                                                                      9.00%
LR (12)                                             44.18                                                                        73.08
Prob                                                  0.000                                                                        0.000 
Obser. prob                                      0.6226                                                                      0.7486
Predict.prob                                     0.7008                                                                      0.8021 
Big 4: Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the auditor is one of the Big Four, 0 otherwise; INST: Major institutional 
ownership percentage; NAT: Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the nationality of the institutional investor is foreign, 0 
otherwise;  LRD:  Long term  debt  to  total  assets;  ASTR:  Gross  Property Plant  and  Equipment to  total  assets;  AGE: 
Corporation age since the foundation date; SIZE: Natural logarithm of total assets; SIZE
2: Square of size; GRW: (Total 
sales of next year divided by total sales of current year) -1; T RISK: Total risk (see Appendix 1); O RISK: Operating Risk 
(see Appendix 1); MOM: Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the firm is listed on more than one market, 0 otherwise; 




































0APPENDIX A: RISK COMPUTATION USING WORLDSCOPE DATABASE
                                                     
Operating Risk
Δ operating income [1.250]t
                        O RISK = σ                                                               for t = -4 to 0.
Total assets [2.9991]t-1
Total Risk
       
                                                                                                                              t = -4 to 0.                            
Note: [Worldscope items between brackets]
                                    
Ƥ (Common share outstanding [5.001]  * Price closing [5.301]) t
+ interest expense on debt [1.251] t + cash dividend paid [4.551] t
         T RISK = σ        
                            [Total Assets [2.999] – Common Equity [3.501] + Closing Price [5.301] * 




































0APPENDIX B: CORRELATION MATRIX BETWEEN EXPLONATORY VARIABLES
             
Big 4    INST NAT LTB ASTR AGE   SIZE GRW O RISK     T RISK     MOM ROA
Big 4 1.000
INST -0.058 1.000
NAT 0.094 -0.027 1.000
LTB -0.058 -0.059 -0.047 1.000
ASTR 0.089 0.069 0.128 0.102 1.000
AGE -0.026 0.039 -0.070 0.078 0.245 1.000
SIZE 0.117 0.057 0.090 -0.075 0.253 0.356 1.000
GRW -0.021 -0.077 0.004 0.027 -0.104 -0.135 -0.166 1.000
T RISK 0.025 -0.069 0.090 0.039 0.064 -0.043 -0.177 0.057 1.000
O RISK 0.081 -0.025 -0.030 0.013 0.016 0.146 0.049 0.019 0.314 1.000
MOM 0.196 -0.078 0.242 -0.007 0.133 -0.029 0.305 -0.076 0.049 0.035 1.000
ROA -0.068 0.013 -0.074 0.302 0.156 0.100 -0.039 -0.059 -0.097 -0.048 -0.051 1.000
     
Big 4: Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the auditor is one of the Big Four, 0 otherwise; INST: Major institutional ownership percentage; NAT: Dummy 
variable, which equals 1 if the nationality of the institutional investor is foreign, 0 otherwise; LRD: Long term debt to total assets; ASTR: Gross Property Plant 
and Equipment to total assets; AGE: Corporation age since the foundation date; SIZE: Natural logarithm of total assets; SIZE
2: Square of size; GRW: (Total 
sales of next year divided by total sales of current year) -1; T RISK: Total risk (see Appendix 1); O RISK: Operating Risk (see Appendix 1); MOM: Dummy 
variable, which equals 1 if the firm is listed on more than one market, 0 otherwise;  ROA: Return on Assets. 
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